systemd-cryptenroll(1) — Linux manual page

NAME | SYNOPSIS | DESCRIPTION | LIMITATIONS | COMPATIBILITY | OPTIONS | CREDENTIALS | EXIT STATUS | EXAMPLES | SEE ALSO | NOTES | COLOPHON

SYSTEMD-CRYPTENROLL(1)     systemd-cryptenroll    SYSTEMD-CRYPTENROLL(1)

NAME         top

       systemd-cryptenroll - Enroll PKCS#11, FIDO2, TPM2 token/devices
       to LUKS2 encrypted volumes

SYNOPSIS         top


       systemd-cryptenroll [OPTIONS...] [DEVICE]

DESCRIPTION         top

       systemd-cryptenroll is a tool for enrolling hardware security
       tokens and devices into a LUKS2 encrypted volume, which may then
       be used to unlock the volume during boot. Specifically, it
       supports tokens and credentials of the following kind to be
       enrolled:

        1. PKCS#11 security tokens and smartcards that may carry an RSA
           or EC key pair (e.g. various YubiKeys)

        2. FIDO2 security tokens that implement the "hmac-secret"
           extension (most FIDO2 keys, including YubiKeys)

        3. TPM2 security devices

        4. Regular passphrases

        5. Recovery keys. These are similar to regular passphrases,
           however are randomly generated on the computer and thus
           generally have higher entropy than user-chosen passphrases.
           Their character set has been designed to ensure they are easy
           to type in, while having high entropy. They may also be
           scanned off screen using QR codes. Recovery keys may be used
           for unlocking LUKS2 volumes wherever passphrases are
           accepted. They are intended to be used in combination with an
           enrolled hardware security token, as a recovery option when
           the token is lost.

       In addition, the tool may be used to enumerate currently enrolled
       security tokens and wipe a subset of them. The latter may be
       combined with the enrollment operation of a new security token,
       in order to update or replace enrollments.

       The tool supports only LUKS2 volumes, as it stores token
       meta-information in the LUKS2 JSON token area, which is not
       available in other encryption formats.

       systemd-cryptsetup operates on the device backing /var/ if no
       device is specified explicitly, and no wipe operation is
       requested. (Note that in the typical case where /var/ is on the
       same file system as the root file system, this hence enrolls a
       key into the backing device of the root file system.)

   TPM2 PCRs and policies
       PCRs allow binding of the encryption of secrets to specific
       software versions and system state, so that the enrolled key is
       only accessible (may be "unsealed") if specific trusted software
       and/or configuration is used. Such bindings may be created with
       the option --tpm2-pcrs= described below.

       Secrets may also be bound indirectly: a signed policy for a state
       of some combination of PCR values is provided, and the secret is
       bound to the public part of the key used to sign this policy.
       This means that the owner of a key can generate a sequence of
       signed policies, for specific software versions and system
       states, and the secret can be decrypted as long as the machine
       state matches one of those policies. For example, a vendor may
       provide such a policy for each kernel+initrd update, allowing
       users to encrypt secrets so that they can be decrypted when
       running any kernel+initrd signed by the vendor. Such bindings may
       be created with the options --tpm2-public-key=,
       --tpm2-public-key-pcrs=, --tpm2-signature= described below.

       See Linux TPM PCR Registry[1] for an authoritative list of PCRs
       and how they are updated. The table below contains a quick
       reference, describing in particular the PCRs modified by systemd.

       Table 1. Well-known PCR Definitions
       ┌─────┬─────────────────────┬───────────────────────────────┐
       │ PCR name                Explanation                   │
       ├─────┼─────────────────────┼───────────────────────────────┤
       │ 0   │ platform-code       │ Core system                   │
       │     │                     │ firmware                      │
       │     │                     │ executable code;              │
       │     │                     │ changes on                    │
       │     │                     │ firmware updates              │
       ├─────┼─────────────────────┼───────────────────────────────┤
       │ 1   │ platform-config     │ Core system                   │
       │     │                     │ firmware data/host            │
       │     │                     │ platform                      │
       │     │                     │ configuration;                │
       │     │                     │ typically contains            │
       │     │                     │ serial and model              │
       │     │                     │ numbers, changes              │
       │     │                     │ on basic                      │
       │     │                     │ hardware/CPU/RAM              │
       │     │                     │ replacements                  │
       ├─────┼─────────────────────┼───────────────────────────────┤
       │ 2   │ external-code       │ Extended or                   │
       │     │                     │ pluggable                     │
       │     │                     │ executable code;              │
       │     │                     │ includes option               │
       │     │                     │ ROMs on pluggable             │
       │     │                     │ hardware                      │
       ├─────┼─────────────────────┼───────────────────────────────┤
       │ 3   │ external-config     │ Extended or                   │
       │     │                     │ pluggable firmware            │
       │     │                     │ data; includes                │
       │     │                     │ information about             │
       │     │                     │ pluggable hardware            │
       ├─────┼─────────────────────┼───────────────────────────────┤
       │ 4   │ boot-loader-code    │ Boot loader and               │
       │     │                     │ additional                    │
       │     │                     │ drivers, PE                   │
       │     │                     │ binaries invoked              │
       │     │                     │ by the boot                   │
       │     │                     │ loader; changes on            │
       │     │                     │ boot loader                   │
       │     │                     │ updates.                      │
       │     │                     │ sd-stub(7)                    │
       │     │                     │ measures system               │
       │     │                     │ extension images              │
       │     │                     │ read from the ESP             │
       │     │                     │ here too (see                 │
       │     │                     │ systemd-sysext(8)).           │
       ├─────┼─────────────────────┼───────────────────────────────┤
       │ 5   │ boot-loader-config  │ GPT/Partition                 │
       │     │                     │ table; changes when           │
       │     │                     │ the partitions are            │
       │     │                     │ added, modified, or           │
       │     │                     │ removed                       │
       ├─────┼─────────────────────┼───────────────────────────────┤
       │ 7   │ secure-boot-policy  │ Secure Boot state;            │
       │     │                     │ changes when UEFI             │
       │     │                     │ SecureBoot mode is            │
       │     │                     │ enabled/disabled,             │
       │     │                     │ or firmware                   │
       │     │                     │ certificates (PK,             │
       │     │                     │ KEK, db, dbx, ...)            │
       │     │                     │ changes.                      │
       ├─────┼─────────────────────┼───────────────────────────────┤
       │ 9   │ kernel-initrd       │ The Linux kernel              │
       │     │                     │ measures all                  │
       │     │                     │ initrds it receives           │
       │     │                     │ into this PCR.                │
       ├─────┼─────────────────────┼───────────────────────────────┤
       │ 10  │ ima                 │ The IMA project               │
       │     │                     │ measures its                  │
       │     │                     │ runtime state into            │
       │     │                     │ this PCR.                     │
       ├─────┼─────────────────────┼───────────────────────────────┤
       │ 11  │ kernel-boot         │ systemd-stub(7)               │
       │     │                     │ measures the ELF              │
       │     │                     │ kernel image,                 │
       │     │                     │ embedded initrd and           │
       │     │                     │ other payload of              │
       │     │                     │ the PE image it is            │
       │     │                     │ placed in into this           │
       │     │                     │ PCR.                          │
       │     │                     │ systemd-pcrphase.service(8)   │
       │     │                     │ measures boot phase           │
       │     │                     │ strings into this             │
       │     │                     │ PCR at various                │
       │     │                     │ milestones of the             │
       │     │                     │ boot process.                 │
       ├─────┼─────────────────────┼───────────────────────────────┤
       │ 12  │ kernel-config       │ systemd-boot(7) measures      │
       │     │                     │ the kernel command line       │
       │     │                     │ into this PCR.                │
       │     │                     │ systemd-stub(7) measures      │
       │     │                     │ any manually specified        │
       │     │                     │ kernel command line (i.e. a   │
       │     │                     │ kernel command line that      │
       │     │                     │ overrides the one embedded    │
       │     │                     │ in the unified PE image)      │
       │     │                     │ and loaded credentials into   │
       │     │                     │ this PCR.                     │
       ├─────┼─────────────────────┼───────────────────────────────┤
       │ 13  │ sysexts             │ systemd-stub(7) measures      │
       │     │                     │ any systemd-sysext(8)         │
       │     │                     │ images it passes to the       │
       │     │                     │ booted kernel into this       │
       │     │                     │ PCR.                          │
       ├─────┼─────────────────────┼───────────────────────────────┤
       │ 14  │ shim-policy         │ The shim project measures     │
       │     │                     │ its "MOK" certificates and    │
       │     │                     │ hashes into this PCR.         │
       ├─────┼─────────────────────┼───────────────────────────────┤
       │ 15  │ system-identity     │ systemd-cryptsetup(8)         │
       │     │                     │ optionally measures the       │
       │     │                     │ volume key of activated       │
       │     │                     │ LUKS volumes into this PCR.   │
       │     │                     │ systemd-pcrmachine.service(8) │
       │     │                     │ measures the machine-id(5)    │
       │     │                     │ into this PCR.                │
       │     │                     │ [email protected](8)     │
       │     │                     │ measures mount points, file   │
       │     │                     │ system UUIDs, labels,         │
       │     │                     │ partition UUIDs of the root   │
       │     │                     │ and /var/ filesystems into    │
       │     │                     │ this PCR.                     │
       ├─────┼─────────────────────┼───────────────────────────────┤
       │ 16  │ debug               │ Debug                         │
       ├─────┼─────────────────────┼───────────────────────────────┤
       │ 23  │ application-support │ Application Support           │
       └─────┴─────────────────────┴───────────────────────────────┘

       In general, encrypted volumes would be bound to some combination
       of PCRs 7, 11, and 14 (if shim/MOK is used). In order to allow
       firmware and OS version updates, it is typically not advisable to
       use PCRs such as 0 and 2, since the program code they cover
       should already be covered indirectly through the certificates
       measured into PCR 7. Validation through certificates hashes is
       typically preferable over validation through direct measurements
       as it is less brittle in context of OS/firmware updates: the
       measurements will change on every update, but signatures should
       remain unchanged. See the Linux TPM PCR Registry[1] for more
       discussion.

LIMITATIONS         top

       Note that currently when enrolling a new key of one of the five
       supported types listed above, it is required to first provide a
       passphrase, a recovery key, a FIDO2 token, or a TPM2 key. It's
       currently not supported to unlock a device with a PKCS#11 key in
       order to enroll a new PKCS#11 key. Thus, if in future key
       roll-over is desired it's generally recommended to ensure a
       passphrase, a recovery key, a FIDO2 token, or a TPM2 key is
       always enrolled.

       Also note that support for enrolling multiple FIDO2 tokens is
       currently limited. When multiple FIDO2 tokens are enrolled,
       systemd-cryptsetup will perform pre-flight requests to attempt to
       identify which of the enrolled tokens are currently plugged in.
       However, this is not possible for FIDO2 tokens with user
       verification (UV, usually via biometrics), in which case it will
       fall back to attempting each enrolled token one by one. This will
       result in multiple prompts for PIN and user verification. This
       limitation does not apply to PKCS#11 tokens.

COMPATIBILITY         top

       Security technology both in systemd and in the general industry
       constantly evolves. In order to provide best security guarantees,
       the way TPM2, FIDO2, PKCS#11 devices are enrolled is regularly
       updated in newer versions of systemd. Whenever this happens the
       following compatibility guarantees are given:

       •   Old enrollments continue to be supported and may be unlocked
           with newer versions of [email protected](8).

       •   The opposite is not guaranteed however: it might not be
           possible to unlock volumes with enrollments done with a newer
           version of systemd-cryptenroll with an older version of
           systemd-cryptsetup.

       That said, it is generally recommended to use matching versions
       of systemd-cryptenroll and systemd-cryptsetup, since this is best
       tested and supported.

       It might be advisable to re-enroll existing enrollments to take
       benefit of newer security features, as they are added to systemd.

OPTIONS         top

       The following options are understood:

       --password
           Enroll a regular password/passphrase. This command is mostly
           equivalent to cryptsetup luksAddKey, however may be combined
           with --wipe-slot= in one call, see below.

           Added in version 248.

       --recovery-key
           Enroll a recovery key. Recovery keys are mostly identical to
           passphrases, but are computer-generated instead of being
           chosen by a human, and thus have a guaranteed high entropy.
           The key uses a character set that is easy to type in, and may
           be scanned off screen via a QR code.

           Added in version 248.

       --unlock-key-file=PATH
           Use a file instead of a password/passphrase read from stdin
           to unlock the volume. Expects the PATH to the file containing
           your key to unlock the volume. Currently there is nothing
           like --key-file-offset= or --key-file-size= so this file has
           to only contain the full key.

           Added in version 252.

       --unlock-fido2-device=PATH
           Use a FIDO2 device instead of a password/passphrase read from
           stdin to unlock the volume. Expects a hidraw device referring
           to the FIDO2 device (e.g.  /dev/hidraw1). Alternatively the
           special value "auto" may be specified, in order to
           automatically determine the device node of a currently
           plugged in security token (of which there must be exactly
           one). This automatic discovery is unsupported if
           --fido2-device= option is also specified.

           Added in version 253.

       --unlock-tpm2-device=PATH
           Use a TPM2 device instead of a password/passhprase read from
           stdin to unlock the volume. Expects a device node path
           referring to the TPM2 chip (e.g.  /dev/tpmrm0). Alternatively
           the special value "auto" may be specified, in order to
           automatically determine the device node of a currently
           discovered TPM2 device (of which there must be exactly one).

           Added in version 256.

       --pkcs11-token-uri=URI
           Enroll a PKCS#11 security token or smartcard (e.g. a
           YubiKey). Expects a PKCS#11 URI that allows finding an X.509
           certificate or a public key on the token. The URI must also
           be suitable to find a related private key after changing the
           type of object in it. Alternatively the special value "auto"
           may be specified, in order to automatically determine the
           suitable URI if a single security token containing a single
           key pair is plugged in. The special value "list" may be used
           to enumerate all suitable PKCS#11 tokens currently plugged
           in.

           The PKCS#11 token must contain an RSA or EC key pair which
           will be used to unlock a LUKS2 volume. For RSA, a randomly
           generated volume key is encrypted with a public key in the
           token, and stored in the LUKS2 JSON token header area. To
           unlock a volume, the stored encrypted volume key will be
           decrypted with a private key in the token. For ECC, ECDH
           algorithm is used: we generate a pair of EC keys in the same
           EC group, then derive a shared secret using the generated
           private key and the public key in the token. The derived
           shared secret is used as a volume key. The generated public
           key is stored in the LUKS2 JSON token header area. The
           generated private key is erased. To unlock a volume, we
           derive the shared secret with the stored public key and a
           private key in the token.

           In order to unlock a LUKS2 volume with an enrolled PKCS#11
           security token, specify the pkcs11-uri= option in the
           respective /etc/crypttab line:

               myvolume /dev/sda1 - pkcs11-uri=auto

           See crypttab(5) for a more comprehensive example of a
           systemd-cryptenroll invocation and its matching /etc/crypttab
           line.

           Added in version 248.

       --fido2-credential-algorithm=STRING
           Specify COSE algorithm used in credential generation. The
           default value is "es256". Supported values are "es256",
           "rs256" and "eddsa".

           "es256" denotes ECDSA over NIST P-256 with SHA-256.  "rs256"
           denotes 2048-bit RSA with PKCS#1.5 padding and SHA-256.
           "eddsa" denotes EDDSA over Curve25519 with SHA-512.

           Note that your authenticator may choose not to support some
           algorithms.

           Added in version 251.

       --fido2-device=PATH
           Enroll a FIDO2 security token that implements the
           "hmac-secret" extension (e.g. a YubiKey). Expects a hidraw
           device referring to the FIDO2 device (e.g.  /dev/hidraw1).
           Alternatively the special value "auto" may be specified, in
           order to automatically determine the device node of a
           currently plugged in security token (of which there must be
           exactly one). This automatic discovery is unsupported if
           --unlock-fido2-device= option is also specified. The special
           value "list" may be used to enumerate all suitable FIDO2
           tokens currently plugged in. Note that many hardware security
           tokens that implement FIDO2 also implement the older PKCS#11
           standard. Typically FIDO2 is preferable, given it's simpler
           to use and more modern.

           In order to unlock a LUKS2 volume with an enrolled FIDO2
           security token, specify the fido2-device= option in the
           respective /etc/crypttab line:

               myvolume /dev/sda1 - fido2-device=auto

           See crypttab(5) for a more comprehensive example of a
           systemd-cryptenroll invocation and its matching /etc/crypttab
           line.

           Added in version 248.

       --fido2-with-client-pin=BOOL
           When enrolling a FIDO2 security token, controls whether to
           require the user to enter a PIN when unlocking the volume
           (the FIDO2 "clientPin" feature). Defaults to "yes". (Note:
           this setting is without effect if the security token does not
           support the "clientPin" feature at all, or does not allow
           enabling or disabling it.)

           Added in version 249.

       --fido2-with-user-presence=BOOL
           When enrolling a FIDO2 security token, controls whether to
           require the user to verify presence (tap the token, the FIDO2
           "up" feature) when unlocking the volume. Defaults to "yes".
           (Note: this setting is without effect if the security token
           does not support the "up" feature at all, or does not allow
           enabling or disabling it.)

           Added in version 249.

       --fido2-with-user-verification=BOOL
           When enrolling a FIDO2 security token, controls whether to
           require user verification when unlocking the volume (the
           FIDO2 "uv" feature). Defaults to "no". (Note: this setting is
           without effect if the security token does not support the
           "uv" feature at all, or does not allow enabling or disabling
           it.)

           Added in version 249.

       --tpm2-device=PATH
           Enroll a TPM2 security chip. Expects a device node path
           referring to the TPM2 chip (e.g.  /dev/tpmrm0). Alternatively
           the special value "auto" may be specified, in order to
           automatically determine the device node of a currently
           discovered TPM2 device (of which there must be exactly one).
           The special value "list" may be used to enumerate all
           suitable TPM2 devices currently discovered.

           In order to unlock a LUKS2 volume with an enrolled TPM2
           security chip, specify the tpm2-device= option in the
           respective /etc/crypttab line:

               myvolume /dev/sda1 - tpm2-device=auto

           See crypttab(5) for a more comprehensive example of a
           systemd-cryptenroll invocation and its matching /etc/crypttab
           line.

           Use --tpm2-pcrs= (see below) to configure which TPM2 PCR
           indexes to bind the enrollment to.

           Added in version 248.

       --tpm2-device-key=PATH
           Enroll a TPM2 security chip using its public key. Expects a
           path referring to the TPM2 public key in TPM2B_PUBLIC format.
           This cannot be used with --tpm2-device=, as it performs the
           same operation, but without connecting to the TPM2 security
           chip; instead the enrollment is calculated using the provided
           TPM2 key. This is useful in situations where the TPM2
           security chip is not available at the time of enrollment.

           The key, in most cases, should be the Storage Root Key (SRK)
           from a local TPM2 security chip. If a key from a different
           handle (not the SRK) is used, you must specify its handle
           index using --tpm2-seal-key-handle=.

           The systemd-tpm2-setup.service(8) service writes the SRK to
           /run/systemd/tpm2-srk-public-key.tpm2b_public automatically
           during boot, in the correct format.

           Alternatively, you may use systemd-analyze srk to retrieve
           the SRK from the TPM2 security chip explicitly. See
           systemd-analyze(1) for details. Example:

               systemd-analyze srk > srk.tpm2b_public

           Added in version 255.

       --tpm2-seal-key-handle=HANDLE
           Configures which parent key to use for sealing, using the TPM
           handle (index) of the key. This is used to "seal" (encrypt) a
           secret and must be used later to "unseal" (decrypt) the
           secret. Expects a hexadecimal 32bit integer, optionally
           prefixed with "0x". Allowable values are any handle index in
           the persistent ("0x81000000"-"0x81ffffff") or transient
           ("0x80000000"-"0x80ffffff") ranges. Since transient handles
           are lost after a TPM reset, and may be flushed during TPM
           context switching, they should not be used except for very
           specific use cases, e.g. testing.

           The default is the Storage Root Key (SRK) handle index
           "0x81000001". A value of 0 will use the default. For the SRK
           handle, a new key will be created and stored in the TPM if
           one does not already exist; for any other handle, the key
           must already exist in the TPM at the specified handle index.

           This should not be changed unless you know what you are
           doing.

           Added in version 255.

       --tpm2-pcrs=PCR[+PCR...]
           Configures the TPM2 PCRs (Platform Configuration Registers)
           to bind to when enrollment is requested via --tpm2-device=.
           Takes a list of PCR entries, where each entry starts with a
           name or numeric index in the range 0...23, optionally
           followed by ":" and a hash algorithm name (specifying the PCR
           bank), optionally followed by "=" and a hash digest value.
           Multiple PCR entries are separated by "+". If not specified,
           the default is to use PCR 7 only. If an empty string is
           specified, binds the enrollment to no PCRs at all. See the
           table above for a list of available PCRs.

           Example:
           --tpm2-pcrs=boot-loader-code+platform-config+boot-loader-config
           specifies that PCR registers 4, 1, and 5 should be used.

           Example: --tpm2-pcrs=7:sha256 specifies that PCR register 7
           from the SHA256 bank should be used.

           Example:
           --tpm2-pcrs=4:sha1=3a3f780f11a4b49969fcaa80cd6e3957c33b2275
           specifies that PCR register 4 from the SHA1 bank should be
           used, and a hash digest value of
           3a3f780f11a4b49969fcaa80cd6e3957c33b2275 will be used instead
           of reading the current PCR value.

           Added in version 248.

       --tpm2-with-pin=BOOL
           When enrolling a TPM2 device, controls whether to require the
           user to enter a PIN when unlocking the volume in addition to
           PCR binding, based on TPM2 policy authentication. Defaults to
           "no". Despite being called PIN, any character can be used,
           not just numbers.

           Note that incorrect PIN entry when unlocking increments the
           TPM dictionary attack lockout mechanism, and may lock out
           users for a prolonged time, depending on its configuration.
           The lockout mechanism is a global property of the TPM,
           systemd-cryptenroll does not control or configure the lockout
           mechanism. You may use tpm2-tss tools to inspect or configure
           the dictionary attack lockout, with tpm2_getcap(1) and
           tpm2_dictionarylockout(1) commands, respectively.

           Added in version 251.

       --tpm2-public-key=PATH, --tpm2-public-key-pcrs=PCR[+PCR...],
       --tpm2-signature=PATH
           Configures a TPM2 signed PCR policy to bind encryption to.
           The --tpm2-public-key= option accepts a path to a PEM encoded
           RSA public key, to bind the encryption to. If this is not
           specified explicitly, but a file tpm2-pcr-public-key.pem
           exists in one of the directories /etc/systemd/,
           /run/systemd/, /usr/lib/systemd/ (searched in this order), it
           is automatically used. The --tpm2-public-key-pcrs= option
           takes a list of TPM2 PCR indexes to bind to (same syntax as
           --tpm2-pcrs= described above). If not specified defaults to
           11 (i.e. this binds the policy to any unified kernel image
           for which a PCR signature can be provided).

           Note the difference between --tpm2-pcrs= and
           --tpm2-public-key-pcrs=: the former binds decryption to the
           current, specific PCR values; the latter binds decryption to
           any set of PCR values for which a signature by the specified
           public key can be provided. The latter is hence more useful
           in scenarios where software updates shell be possible without
           losing access to all previously encrypted LUKS2 volumes. Like
           with --tpm2-pcrs=, names defined in the table above can also
           be used to specify the registers, for instance
           --tpm2-public-key-pcrs=boot-loader-code+system-identity.

           The --tpm2-signature= option takes a path to a TPM2 PCR
           signature file as generated by the systemd-measure(1) tool.
           If this is not specified explicitly, a suitable signature
           file tpm2-pcr-signature.json is searched for in
           /etc/systemd/, /run/systemd/, /usr/lib/systemd/ (in this
           order) and used. If a signature file is specified or found it
           is used to verify if the volume can be unlocked with it given
           the current PCR state, before the new slot is written to
           disk. This is intended as safety net to ensure that access to
           a volume is not lost if a public key is enrolled for which no
           valid signature for the current PCR state is available. If
           the supplied signature does not unlock the current PCR state
           and public key combination, no slot is enrolled and the
           operation will fail. If no signature file is specified or
           found no such safety verification is done.

           Added in version 252.

       --tpm2-pcrlock=PATH
           Configures a TPM2 pcrlock policy to bind encryption to.
           Expects a path to a pcrlock policy file as generated by the
           systemd-pcrlock(1) tool. If a TPM2 device is enrolled and
           this option is not used but a file pcrlock.json is found in
           /run/systemd/ or /var/lib/systemd/ it is automatically used.
           Assign an empty string to turn this behaviour off.

           Added in version 255.

       --wipe-slot=SLOT[,SLOT...]
           Wipes one or more LUKS2 key slots. Takes a comma separated
           list of numeric slot indexes, or the special strings "all"
           (for wiping all key slots), "empty" (for wiping all key slots
           that are unlocked by an empty passphrase), "password" (for
           wiping all key slots that are unlocked by a traditional
           passphrase), "recovery" (for wiping all key slots that are
           unlocked by a recovery key), "pkcs11" (for wiping all key
           slots that are unlocked by a PKCS#11 token), "fido2" (for
           wiping all key slots that are unlocked by a FIDO2 token),
           "tpm2" (for wiping all key slots that are unlocked by a TPM2
           chip), or any combination of these strings or numeric
           indexes, in which case all slots matching either are wiped.
           As safety precaution an operation that wipes all slots
           without exception (so that the volume cannot be unlocked at
           all anymore, unless the volume key is known) is refused.

           This switch may be used alone, in which case only the
           requested wipe operation is executed. It may also be used in
           combination with any of the enrollment options listed above,
           in which case the enrollment is completed first, and only
           when successful the wipe operation executed — and the newly
           added slot is always excluded from the wiping. Combining
           enrollment and slot wiping may thus be used to update
           existing enrollments:

               systemd-cryptenroll /dev/sda1 --wipe-slot=tpm2 --tpm2-device=auto

           The above command will enroll the TPM2 chip, and then wipe
           all previously created TPM2 enrollments on the LUKS2 volume,
           leaving only the newly created one. Combining wiping and
           enrollment may also be used to replace enrollments of
           different types, for example for changing from a PKCS#11
           enrollment to a FIDO2 one:

               systemd-cryptenroll /dev/sda1 --wipe-slot=pkcs11 --fido2-device=auto

           Or for replacing an enrolled empty password by TPM2:

               systemd-cryptenroll /dev/sda1 --wipe-slot=empty --tpm2-device=auto

           Added in version 248.

       -h, --help
           Print a short help text and exit.

       --version
           Print a short version string and exit.

CREDENTIALS         top

       systemd-cryptenroll supports the service credentials logic as
       implemented by ImportCredential=/LoadCredential=/SetCredential=
       (see systemd.exec(5) for details). The following credentials are
       used when passed in:

       cryptenroll.passphrase, cryptenroll.new-passphrase
           May contain the passphrase to unlock the volume with/to newly
           enroll.

           Added in version 256.

       cryptenroll.tpm2-pin, cryptenroll.new-tpm2-pin
           May contain the TPM2 PIN to unlock the volume with/to newly
           enroll.

           Added in version 256.

       cryptenroll.fido2-pin
           If a FIDO2 token is enrolled this may contain the PIN of the
           token.

           Added in version 256.

       cryptenroll.pkcs11-pin
           If a PKCS#11 token is enrolled this may contain the PIN of
           the token.

           Added in version 256.

EXIT STATUS         top

       On success, 0 is returned, a non-zero failure code otherwise.

EXAMPLES         top

       crypttab(5) and systemd-measure(1) contain various examples
       employing systemd-cryptenroll.

SEE ALSO         top

       systemd(1), [email protected](8), crypttab(5),
       cryptsetup(8), systemd-measure(1)

NOTES         top

        1. Linux TPM PCR Registry
           https://uapi-group.org/specifications/specs/linux_tpm_pcr_registry/

COLOPHON         top

       This page is part of the systemd (systemd system and service
       manager) project.  Information about the project can be found at
       ⟨http://www.freedesktop.org/wiki/Software/systemd⟩.  If you have
       a bug report for this manual page, see
       ⟨http://www.freedesktop.org/wiki/Software/systemd/#bugreports⟩.
       This page was obtained from the project's upstream Git repository
       ⟨https://github.com/systemd/systemd.git⟩ on 2024-06-14.  (At that
       time, the date of the most recent commit that was found in the
       repository was 2024-06-13.)  If you discover any rendering
       problems in this HTML version of the page, or you believe there
       is a better or more up-to-date source for the page, or you have
       corrections or improvements to the information in this COLOPHON
       (which is not part of the original manual page), send a mail to
       [email protected]

systemd 257~devel                                 SYSTEMD-CRYPTENROLL(1)

Pages that refer to this page: systemd-creds(1)crypttab(5)repart.d(5)systemd.directives(7)systemd.index(7)systemd-stub(7)systemd-cryptsetup(8)systemd-cryptsetup-generator(8)systemd-pcrlock(8)systemd-repart(8)